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AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS WITH(IN) 
CATHOLICISM 
Richard W. Garnett* 
CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A HISTORY. By John T. 
McGreevy. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co. 2003. Pp. 431. 
$26.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
The jacket photo for John T. McGreevy's Catholicism and 
American Freedom1 is striking. In the foreground, a young and 
vigorous Pope John Paul II, censer in hand,2 strides across an altar 
platform on the Mall in Washington, D.C. His attention is fixed off­
camera, presumably at the altar he is about to reverence with incense. 
At the bottom of the picture, gathered around and below the platform, 
sits a grainy group of mitre-wearing bishops.3 Looming directly over 
the scene, in the background yet dominating the photograph, is the 
towering dome of the U.S. Capitol Building. 
This picture is worth many thousand words; it evokes and captures 
many of the events described, themes developed, and debates 
presented in this excellent book. The crowd of faceless bishops, 
lurking beneath the foundations of the Capitol, recalls the famous 
Thomas Nast cartoon depicting a mass of crawling crocodile-like 
prelates who, with toothy, gaping mitres, stalk Tammany-abandoned 
schoolchildren cowering in the ruins of the public schools and armed 
only with the Holy Bible.4 That the Church's rituals are proceeding in 
* Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School.-Ed. I am grateful to the editors and 
staff of the Michigan Law Review for their help and patience, and also to many colleagues 
and friends for their comments and criticism. Thanks are due, in particular, to Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, Michael Scaperlanda, Eric Claeys, Greg Sisk, John Nagle, Bob Rodes, and Tom 
Shaffer. 
1. John T. McGreevy is the John A. O'Brien Associate Professor of History at the 
University of Notre Dame. 
2. A "censer " (also called a "thurible") is a bowl-like vessel, suspended from a chain, 
which is used for burning incense in many Roman Catholic and other religious liturgies. 
3. A "mitre " is the pointed folding-cap often worn by bishops in the Roman Catholic 
and some other churches. 
4. This Nast illustration, "The American River Ganges - The Priests and the Children" 
(Sept. 30, 1871), is reproduced on the cover of LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE 
1191 
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our most public of public squares, in the shadow of the unmistakably 
churchlike seat of our national government, reminds us that our 
"separation of church and state" has long been anything but strict, and 
perhaps also that even our professedly secular state has at times 
demanded faithlike loyalty to its own political orthodoxies.5 That the 
Capitol dome so resembles that of St. Paul's Cathedral in London 
highlights the tension between Catholicism and America's Protestant 
origins, traditions, and premises. In the picture, the Pope occupies an 
in-between place, as Catholics in America often have: he appears both 
suspended and intent on mediating between the ancient, hierarchical 
Church he leads and the modern, democratic nation he is addressing. 
His posture is neither defensive nor defiant, but confident. It is as if his 
aim is not to impose a conclusion, but to propose a claim and to 
initiate a conversation. 
Catholicism and American Freedom is about, and part of, that 
conversation. This book is relevant and important reading for anyone 
who aspires to understand American culture, history, and politics. It 
should also be of particular interest to lawyers and legal scholars. And, 
the book is welcome, given the appallingly widespread ignorance of 
the themes and topics it explores.6 
I. 
John T. McGreevy is the author of Parish Boundaries: The 
Catholic Encounter With Race in the Twentieth-Century Urban North, 
a respected history.7 His latest book, Catholicism and American 
Freedom, confirms McGreevy's skill and sensitivity. It is timely, 
engaging, provocative, and entertaining. It is carefully researched and 
annotated, but never pedantic or tedious. McGreevy's prose is clear 
and accessible; his tone is warm and charitable, balanced but not 
NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL: 1825-1925 (1987), and is also available online at http://historyproject. 
ucdavis.edu/imageapp.php?Major=RE&Minor=D. 
5. See generally, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Bamette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
625 (2003). 
6. It is unfortunate that not only most Americans, but probably most historians as well, 
know little if anything about the conflicts and characters McGreevy portrays, other than 
what they might have absorbed from films such as FAR AND AWAY (1992), THE GANGS OF 
NEW YORK (2002), or ONE MAN'S HERO (1999). See, e.g., Michael J. Lacey, That Old-World 
Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, § 7, at 13 (reviewing JOHN T. MCGREEVY, 
CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (2003) and noting that "most serious readers of 
American history know a good deal about the Protestant past, but next to nothing about 
Catholicism"). ONE MAN'S HERO (1999), an undeservedly overlooked film, is the story of 
the St. Patrick's Batallion (or "San Patricios"), Irish Catholics who fled the U.S. Army 
during the Mexican-American War and ended up fighting for Mexico. Many were eventually 
executed as traitors. 
7. JOHN T. MCGREEVY, PARISH BOUNDARIES: THE CATHOLIC ENCOUNTER WITH 
RACE IN THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBAN NORTH (1996). 
May 2004] Conversations With(in) Catholicism 1193 
bland. He is unobtrusive - though not disingenuously disinterested -
and, with only a few exceptions, steers clear of soapboxes and heavy­
handed editorializing.8 His project seems not to steer, let alone drag, 
his readers to particular conclusions.9 It is, instead, to call their 
attention to the dynamics of a close, complicated, and continuing 
relationship, one whose role in shaping Americans' arguments about 
America is often overlooked. 
Catholicism and American Freedom is not a "Catholic" book. It is 
not a work of devotion, apologetics, or catechesis; nor is it a study of 
the Catholic Church's divisions, crises, or future.10 It is not a 
tendentious chronicle of Catholic misdeeds and corruption or an 
overwrought pseudo-historical indictment,11 nor is it a crusading, 
triumphalistic romp.12 McGreevy braves the waters of interminably 
controversial matters like abortion, parochial-school vouchers, and 
sexual ethics, but this work is not about these issues. He is not a 
"culture warrior"13 and this book is nothing like a polemic or a 
jeremiad. He calls our attention to the reality and role of anti­
Catholicism in the American experience, but his book is not an 
accusation or a complaint, and its concern is not with the question 
whether anti-Catholicism is a persistent or spent force in American 
8. Thus, this book has received generous praise in both The Nation and The New York 
Times; in America and Commonweal, but also in First Things. See Neil Coughlan, The Odd 
Couple, COMMONWEAL, May 9, 2003, at 26 (stating that the work is "splendid"); Lacey, 
supra note 6, at 13 (stating that Catholicism and American Freedom is "brilliant"); Thomas 
Murphy, A Church Aloof or Engaged?, AMERICA, July 21-28, 2003, at 27 (stating that 
McGreevy provides "a vital corrective"); Richard John Neuhaus, A Continuing Survey of 
Religion and Public Life: Catholics, Protestants, and the Meanings of Freedom, FIRST 
THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2003, at 66, 71 (observing that McGreevy's book is a "gift" and a 
"pleasure to read"); JoAnn Wypijewski, Liberal Pieties, THE NATION, Sept. 22, 2003, at 40 
(calling it "fascinating" and "valuable"). 
9. See Wypijewski, supra note 8, at 43 ("Whatever arguments may arise for or against 
liberalism or Catholicism, he leaves them largely to the reader."). 
10. Cf, e.g., DAVID CARLIN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 
AMERICA (2003); DONALD B.  COZZENS, SACRED SILENCE: DENIAL AND THE CRISIS IN THE 
CHURCH (2002); DAVID GIBSON, THE COMING CATHOLIC CHURCH (2003); PETER 
STEINFELS, A PEOPLE ADRIFT: THE CRISIS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 
AMERICA (2003); JOSEPH A. VARACALLI, BRIGHT PROMISE, FAILED COMMUNITY: 
CATHOLICS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ORDER (2000); GEORGE WEIGEL, THE 
COURAGE TO BE CATHOLIC (2002); GARRY WILLS, WHY I AM A CATHOLIC (2002). 
11. Cf, e.g., JAMES CARROLL, CONSTANTINE'S SWORD: THE CHURCH AND THE JEWS 
(2001); JOHN CORNWELL, HITLER'S POPE (1999); DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, A MORAL 
RECKONING (2002); DA YID I. KERTZER, THE POPES AGAINST THE JEWS (2001); GARRY 
WILLS, PAPAL SIN (2000). For a useful corrective to these disappointing and often reckless 
works, see, for example, RONALD J. RYCHLAK, HITLER, THE WAR, AND THE POPE (2000). 
12. Cf, e.g., H.W. CROCKER III, TRIUMPH: THE POWER AND THE GLORY OF THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH - A  2,000-YEAR HISTORY (2001). 
13. Cf, e.g., JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS (1991). 
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culture, law, or politics.14 And, he concludes not with a strident call to 
ideological arms, or a bullet-point litany of policy recommendations, 
but with the cautious, modest suggestion that we temper our 
"romantic view of individual autonomy" with a corrective 
appreciation for associations, communion, and solidarity (p. 295). 
McGreevy's subject, in a nutshell, is the story of how "America" -
or, more particularly, American liberalism15 - has reacted and 
responded to Catholic claims about the nature and purpose of 
"freedom," and how these claims were, in tum, shaped by 
Catholicism's interactions with, internal conversations about, and 
adjustments to American liberalism. This "interplay between Catholic 
and American ideals of freedom" - a dynamic that "remains poorly 
understood" - is the book's unifying storyline (p. 14). Thus, the 
challenge for McGreevy is "to capture two traditions in motion, not 
one: to explore American ideas about Catholicism along with the 
predispositions (at times blinders) framing the mental landscape of 
American Catholics" (p. 15). This book - like John Courtney 
Murray's, more than forty years earlier - considers Americans' 
efforts to work through the questions "whether Catholicism is 
compatible with American democracy" and "whether American 
democracy is compatible with Catholicism."16 
Throughout the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth, it 
was regularly charged and widely believed by American intellectuals 
and leaders that there was something un-American about 
Catholicism's clergy, claims, teachings, practices, structures, traditions, 
and adherents.17 For many people and for many years, the Roman 
14. Cf, e.g. , PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEW ANTI-CATHOLICISM (2003); MARK S. MASSA, 
ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA (2003); ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICAN CULTURE 
(Robert P. Lockwood ed., 2000). 
15. "Liberalism" is, I realize, "a term so protean that it risks becoming useless." Steven 
D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 306 n.4 (1990). For present 
purposes, the term describes "a family of political ideas and practices that emphasize the 
importance of individual freedom and of preserving space for personal autonomy free from 
collective control." Id. 
16. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION ix-x (1960). 
17. This book's title is a play on Paul Blanshard's now-infamous but once-best-selling 
work, American Freedom and Catholic Power, a sustained warning about the threat posed by 
Catholicism to American ideals and values. PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND 
CATHOLIC POWER (1949). 
There is some reason to think that Blanshard's arguments may be returning to 
respectability, at least in some quarters. See, e.g., SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN SECULARISM 302 (2004) (stating that Blanshard's book had "a 
refreshing integrity . . .  because [it begins J with the premise that religious differences are as 
important as religious commonalities.") 
McGreevy addressed Blanshard's arguments, along with their context, genealogy, and 
effects, in an earlier work. John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the 
American Intellectual Imagination, I928-1960, 84 J. AM. HIST. 97 (1997) [hereinafter 
McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own] . 
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Catholic Church served as a foil for "American" values and ideals -
and vice versa. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that American 
liberalism often defined and constructed itself precisely in opposition 
to its image of Catholicism.18 At the same time, Catholic institutions, 
practices, and beliefs developed in response to American and liberal 
challenges, and American Catholics have oscillated uneasily between 
sectarianism, segregation, and counter-culture, on the one hand, and 
engagement, accommodation, and assimilation, on the other.19 
Thus, American liberals often wondered with John Adams 
whether "a free government [can] possibly exist with a Roman 
Catholic Religion. "20 In turn, many Catholics in America responded to 
liberal anti-clericalism and nationalism by "defin[ing] themselves 
against dominant ideas of freedom [and] individual autonomy" (p. 13), 
while others followed Tocqueville in regarding "Catholicism [as] a 
powerful contributor to the 'maintenance of a Democratic Republic in 
the United States.' "21 And while many intellectuals charged that 
Catholicism was un-American to the extent it rejected, or was 
incompatible with, Americans' individualistic understandings of 
"freedom," underappreciated but enormously significant American 
figures such as Orestes Brownson, John Ryan, and John Courtney 
Murray contended not only that Catholicism was consonant with the 
best of American traditions, it might best embody and transmit 
America's founding values.22 Echoing Archbishop John Purcell's 1863 
case for the "moral necessity of emancipation" (p. 82), they insisted 
that " [t]he Catholic Church has ever been the friend of human 
freedom[,] [because] [i]t was Christ's mission to set men free. "23 
18. P. 168 ("[D]iscussion of Catholicism, along with criticism of racial segregation and 
opposition to fascism and communism, helped define the terms of post-war American 
liberalism. "). 
19. For further exploration of this dynamic, see generally, for example , JAY P. DOLAN, 
IN SEARCH OF AN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM: A HISTORY OF RELIGION AND CULTURE IN 
TENSION (2002), and JAY P. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE (1985). 
20. P. 33 (quoting Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (May 19, 1821), in 2 
THE ADAMS-JEFFFERSON LETIERS 573 (L. Cappon ed., 1959)). 
21. P. 21 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 287 (G. 
Lawrence trans. , 1988)). 
22. P. 21 (noting that Alexis de Tocqueville "convinced himself that he had discovered a 
new Catholic style, terming Catholicism a powerful contributor to the 'maintenance of a 
Democratic Republic in the United States' "); see also, e.g., Orestes Brownson, Catholicity 
Necessary to Sustain Popular Liberty (October 1845) ("The thesis we propose to maintain is, 
therefore, that without the Roman Catholic religion it is impossible to preserve a democratic 
government, and secure its free, orderly, and wholesome action. "), available at http://www. 
catholicism.org/pages/liberty.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2004); MURRAY, supra note 16, at 41 
("Catholic participation in the American consensus has been full and free . . .  because the 
contents of this consensus . . .  approve themselves to the Catholic intelligence and 
conscience . . . .  The ideas expressed are native to his own universe of discourse. "). 
23. P. 83 (quoting Archbishop Purcell's Lecture at Mozard Hall Last Sunday Nov. 1 ,  
CATH. TELEGRAPH, Nov. 4, 1863, at 860). 
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One particularly effective feature of McGreevy's guided tour 
through the Catholic-American dialogue is the way he frames his story 
around particular, noteworthy participants. Take, for example, the 
muscular anti-liberalism of the nineteenth century's simultaneously 
self-confident and reactionary Catholic revival: McGreevy explores it 
through the exploits and arguments of the charismatic and 
confrontational Jesuit, Fr. Bernadine Wiget, who worked in Boston's 
North End and was a refugee from the anticlericalism then sweeping 
across Europe. Similarly, the arc of Orestes Brownson's dauntingly 
prolific career tracks the efforts of mid-century Catholics in America 
who opposed slavery and secession, but also perceived liberal 
revolution, nationalism, and individualism as threats to authentic 
human freedom. Brownson was determined to resist the common 
assumption of liberals and Catholic revivalists that Catholics opposed 
the American experiment. 24 His work helps McGreevy to explore the 
"tricornered dynamic" of "liberal intellectuals and politicians 
convinced of Catholicism's hostility to freedom and progress, 
ultramontane Catholics determined to resist liberalism's insistence on 
individual autonomy in all spheres, and a loose assemblage of liberal 
Catholics tacking between the two groups" (p. 67).25 
Fr. John Ryan, a Catholic University professor, brought Catholic 
thinking on solidarity and human dignity to bear on twentieth-century 
labor and economic questions, but also scorned the "selfishness" of 
contraception. He embodies in McGreevy's study both the 
rapprochement between Catholic and liberal social reformers who 
embraced economic planning, trade unionism, and Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, and the divisions to come on matters of sexual morality 
and abortion (p. 158). John Courtney Murray's work illustrates the 
efforts of Catholic intellectuals in the middle-twentieth century "to 
move Catholic theology and philosophy toward a more nuanced 
understanding of the challenges posed by modernity" (p. 191), to 
retrieve a Catholic account of democracy and human rights, and to 
articulate a robust, Catholic understanding of religious freedom that 
avoided the errors of both nineteenth-century popes and strict­
separationist Supreme Court justices. 
Catholicism and American Freedom is not a work of legal theory or 
an analysis of legal doctrine, but it has a lot to say about law and to 
24. Brownson urged Catholic immigrants to avoid sectarian self-ghettoization, to 
become "nationalized as well as naturalized, and [to] merge themselves in the great 
American people. " P. 45. And, he expressed "frustration at being pinned between an 'anti­
Catholic sentiment . . .  shared . . .  by the majority of our countrymen' and coreligionists 
creating the impression that a Catholic must make 'himself a foreigner in the land of his 
birth.' " P. 47. For more on Brownson, see, for example, ROBERT A. HERRERA, ORESTES 
BROWNSON (1999); THEODORE MAYNARD, ORESTES BROWNSON (1943); ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, JR., ORESTES A. BROWNSON (1939). 
25. For more on ultramontane Catholics, see infra note 37. 
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lawyers. It provides, for instance, the cultural background that is 
essential for understanding the development and current state of the 
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine. Law both follows 
and shapes culture, and so it should come as no surprise that our 
constitutional law concerning religious freedom has been shaped by 
arguments about religion - in particular, about Roman Catholicism 
- and freedom.26 This book therefore serves as a useful and worthy 
companion to other recent and important works by Philip Hamburger, 
John Witte, John Noonan, Steven Smith, and others.27 Similarly, the 
"radical" nature of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, and the much­
remarked effects of that decision on America's political alignment and 
discourse, are better understood when considered in the context of a 
broader narrative about liberalism and Catholicism, autonomy and 
authority.28 McGreevy's account should also enrich lawyers' studies 
and conversations about education, citizenship, and loyalty.29 His history 
could improve academic debates about the place of "public reason" and 
religious argument in political life,30 the role of mediating associations in 
constitutional law and civil society,31 and the dangers of what the Court 
26. For more on the connection between arguments about Catholicism, on the one 
hand, and the historical and other arguments constitutionalized by Justice Black in Everson, 
on the other, see, for example, pp. 183-86; PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH 
AND STATE 449-78 (2002); Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State 
Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (2001); John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 (1949). 
27. GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); 
DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE (2002);T!MOTHY D. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE (1998); 
HAMBURGER, supra note 26; MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S Goo (2002); JOHN T. NOONAN, 
JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (2000); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE (1998); JOHN WITTE, JR., 
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (2000). 
28. Pp. 277-78 (quoting Professor (and Judge) John T. Noonan's characterization of Roe 
and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, as the "most radical decisions ever issued by the 
Court"); cf John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
29. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A 
MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY (1998); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL 
PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2002); STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS: 
LIFE IN THE CHRISTIAN COLONY (1989); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: 
CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTI CULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000). 
30. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER Goo? RELIGIOUS FAITH AND 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2003); Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that 
Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. 
REV. 639; Symposium, Religion in the Public Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 647 (2001); 
Symposium, Religiously Based Morality: Its Proper Place in American Law and Public 
Policy?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217-570 (2001). 
31. See generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education 
and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841 (2001); John 0. McGinnis, 
Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 
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in Lemon v. Kurtzman called "political division along religious lines."32 
He takes us to the heart of perennial questions - questions that 
lawyers and legal scholars cannot and should not avoid - about the 
prerogatives of the liberal state, the scope and content of religious 
obligations, and even the nature and end of the human person. 
II. 
In the Spring of 1859 (as in the Summer of 2003), the Ten 
Commandments were at center stage.33 Thomas Whall, a ten-year-old 
Catholic schoolboy, was badly beaten by the assistant principal of 
Boston's Eliot School, and ultimately expelled, for refusing to recite 
the Commandments in their "usual form," i.e., the form recorded in 
the King James Version of the Bible.34 Quickly, young Whall's "Filial 
piety, manly Fortitude, and Heroic Faith Under Torture" became 
more than an intramural disciplinary matter.35 
Whall's parish priest - the above-mentioned Fr. Wiget -
challenged local Catholic boys to follow Thomas's example in resisting 
"infidelity and heresy," shamed from the altar those who did not (p. 
8), and publicly criticized the more conciliatory stance of his 
American-born fellow priests (p. 42). The pillars of the Boston 
establishment were outraged by Whall's impudence, warning that " [i]f 
Protestant Christianity is to be abandoned in our public educational 
system, we shall convert the schools of the Puritans into heathen 
temples" (p. 9). They rallied to the "general and common doctrines of 
Christianity" as a necessary defense to a "Romanism" that "allies 
CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002); Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Rethinking 
the Value of Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949 (2004). 
32. 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). 
33. On Thursday, Nov. 13, 2003, Alabama's Chief Justice Roy Moore was removed from 
office by that State's judicial-ethics panel for defying a federal court order that he remove a 
monument to the Ten Commandments from the rotunda of that State's courthouse. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the federal trial court's 
conclusion that the installation and display of the monument violated the First 
Amendment's Establishment Clause. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003). 
34. P. 9. The "Ten Commandments" are recounted differently in a number of Christian 
and Hebrew sources. Compare, e.g. , Exodus 20:1-17 (King James Version), with 
Deuteronomy 5:5-21 (King James Version), and Exodus 20:1-17 (Douay-Rheims Version). 
In the Catholic, Dovay version, for example, the King James prohibition on making "graven 
image[s]" does not appear. As Professor Lubet has noted, this feature of the Catholic 
presentation has long been a subject of anti-Catholic polemic. Steven Lubet, The Ten 
Commandments in Alabama, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 471, 475-76 (1998). For a fascinating 
account of the translation and production of the King James Version of the Bible that 
explores, among other things, its royalist and Anglican agendas, see ADAM NICOLSON, 
Goo's SECRETARIES: THE MAKING OF THE KING JAMES BIBLE (2003). 
35. P. 10. This was the inscription on a goblet sent to Thomas Whall - along with other 
tributes from "admiring Catholics across the country" - by the Catholic community in 
Covington, Kentucky. Id. 
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itself with every false and anti-republican institution which is yet 
tolerated in our glorious country" (pp. 9, 11). Likewise, the trial 
court in Whall's father's (unsuccessful) excessive-force lawsuit 
concluded that the refusal to participate in the recitation from the 
Protestant Bible threatened the good order and "stability of the public 
school," "the granite foundation on which our republican form of 
government rests."36 
Thomas Whall's beating was not "the last gasp[] of the 
Reformation"; rather, the "Eliot School Rebellion" was a "Boston 
variant on a nineteenth-century struggle shaping religion and politics" 
around the world {p. 12). By the same token, Fr. Wiget's belligerence 
was not the idiosyncratic response of one truculent priest, but was 
instead of a piece with a broader, "ultramontane"37 Catholic 
"revival."38 To be sure, anti-Catholicism in America was nothing new, 
and went well beyond the legal penalties imposed upon, and 
disabilities endured by, Catholics in the American colonies and 
states.39 From the Puritans to the Framers and beyond, anti-"popery" 
was thick in the cultural air breathed by the early Americans, who 
were raised on tales of Ar�nadas and Inquisitions, Puritan heroism and 
Bloody Mary, Jesuit schemes and Gunpowder Plots, lecherous 
confessors and baby-killing nuns.40 Thomas Paine's diagnosis would 
36. P. 8 (citation omitted); see also, e.g. , John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A 
Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 300 (2001)  ("Catholic 
students suffered beatings or expulsions for refusing to read from the Protestant Bible, and 
crowds . . .  rioted over whether Catholic children could be released from the classroom 
during Bible reading.") (citation omitted). 
37. "Ultramontane," or "beyond the mountains," in this context denotes support for 
papal supremacy in the Roman Catholic Church, and is usually contrasted with "Gallican," 
which refers to a nineteenth-century movement in the Church favoring national autonomy 
and restrictions on papal power. Cf pp. 12-13 (noting that "ultramontane" is "shorthand for 
a cluster of shifts that included a Vatican-fostered move to Thomistic philosophy, a more 
intense experiential piety . . .  an international outlook suspicious of national variations with 
Catholicism, and a heightened respect for church authorities . . . .  "); p. 26 (describing 
"Gallicanism" as "the notion that national customs might trump Roman regulations"). 
38. The nineteenth century Catholic "revival" was "philosophical, theological, and 
organizational"; it included an emphasis on the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, on more 
pietistic forms of devotion, on "Catholic parishes, schools, and organizations as refuges in an 
increasingly secular, even hostile, world." P. 25. 
39. See, e.g. , THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN 
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 80 (1986): 
In every American colony . . . specific test laws or the possibility of being challenged to 
subscribe to a test or oath of abjuration, with refusal leading to prosecution as a 'popish 
recusant,' ensured the exclusion of Catholics from public life. Even more than these statutes, 
a pervasive opinion that 'Popery' was synonymous with tyranny relegated Catholics to a 
position beyond the realm of acceptability. 
40. McGreevy has observed elsewhere that, "[i]n a certain sense . . .  anti-Catholicism is 
integral to the formation of the United States." John McGreevy, A History of the Culture's 
Bias, Remarks at the Anti-Catholicism: The Last Acceptable Prejudice Conference (May 24, 
2002). See also, e.g., RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860, at 1 
(1938) ("Hatred of Catholics and foreigners had been steadily growing in the United States 
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have enjoyed broad support when he lamented that those in the 
"popish world at this day by not knowing the full manifestation of 
spiritual freedom, enjoy but a shadow of political liberty."41 
In the mid-nineteenth century, as waves of immigration and the 
muscular claims of the Catholic revival collided with America's 
nascent nationalism, long-running theological disputes became 
political and cultural arguments. Liberal Protestants warned that 
Jesuit refugees and other newcomers from Europe were 
"indefatigable enemies of democracy and enlightenment" (p. 23) and 
that Catholicism "retarded" "human progress and freedom" (p. 33), 
while Catholics emphasized the dangers of an excessive and 
"destructive individualism" and proposed a more "communal vision of 
church, state, and society" (p. 26). McGreevy's exploration of the 
"interplay between Catholic and American ideas of freedom" (p. 14) 
begins with this collision, and then follows the course of the resulting 
relationship through a century-and-a-half of American history. 
For starters, he situates the Common School Movement in the 
context of this clash between the anti-liberal understanding of 
freedom embraced in the Catholic "revival," on the one hand, and the 
anti-clericalism and nationalism of the mid-century revolutions, on the 
other.42 The perceived excesses of these revolutions had caused many 
Catholic intellectuals to "define[] themselves against dominant ideas 
of freedom" and "individual autonomy" (p. 13), and to emphasize 
"Catholic parishes, schools, and organizations as refuges in an 
increasingly secular, even hostile, world" (p. 25). And so, as 
"American liberals relied upon schools to produce citizens worthy of a 
democratic republic,"43 Catholics insisted that "the work of education 
[was] a principally religious work,"44 with ultramontanes like Fr. 
for more than two centuries before it took political form with the Native American outburst 
of the 1840's and the Know-Nothingism of the 1850's."). 
41. P. 1 1  (quoting Thomas Paine, Thoughts on Defensive War, in COMMON SENSE AND 
RELATED WRITINGS 68 (Thomas P. Slaughter ed., 2001)). 
42. See generally, e.g. , BILLINGTON, supra note 40; CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE 
MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (1988); ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, VISIONS OF 
SCHOOLING (2000). 
43. P. 38. Similarly, in Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854), another mandatory-
Bible-reading case, the court observed that 
(l]arge masses of foreign populations are among us, weak in the midst of our strength. Mere 
citizenship is of no avail, unless they imbibe the liberal spirit of our laws and institutions, 
unless they become citizens in fact as well as in name. In no other way can the process of 
assimilation be so readily and thoroughly accomplished as through the medium of the public 
schools . . . .  
Id. at 413. 
44. P. 39 (quoting N.J. Perche, De / 'education, PROPAGATEUR CATHOLIQUE, Apr. 3, 
1858, at 81). Cf, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families 'II 16 (1994) (writing that the 
education of children should "be considered a genuine apostolate" and that an educator is "a 
person who 'begets' in a spiritual sense"). 
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Wiget warning that the common-school system "was the most 
complete and most ingenious system that could be devised for 
perverting Catholic youth."45 
McGreevy turns next to slavery, abolitionism, and the Civil War, 
focusing on the intra-Catholic debates about these matters,46 and also 
on Catholics' more general concerns about liberal individualism and 
the centralization of state power. He is therefore able to provide a new 
and nuanced discussion of the antebellum role and stance of Catholics, 
north and south. In particular, McGreevy reveals how " [u]neasiness 
about liberal individualism proved as powerful in shaping Catholic 
views on slavery as in affecting the conflict over education. "47 Like 
every other religious denomination and social group, Catholics were 
divided on the questions of secession, union, and abolition. Thus, 
Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati could pronounce that "Christian 
people disregard [Christ's] precepts and principles and example, when 
they seek to uphold or perpetuate involuntary human servitude" (p. 
83; footnote omitted), while his episcopal colleague across the Ohio 
River, Bishop Martin Spalding of Louisville, was no less adamant that 
Republicans and abolitionists were possessed of a " 'satanic' hatred of 
Catholicism" that "would soon turn against the church" (p. 87; 
footnote omitted). Even Catholics who loathed slavery worried about 
aligning themselves with an abolitionist movement that often "threw 
Catholicism and slavery together in a completely unjust manner" (p. 
78; footnote omitted), and were "sympathetic to the charge that the 
nationalism of the Lincoln administration bordered on dictatorship" 
(p. 73; footnote omitted). 
As if to confirm liberal Catholics' antebellum worries, President 
Grant warned in a famous 1875 speech to Union Army veterans that: 
[I]f we are to have another contest in the near future of our national 
existence, I predict that the dividing line will not be Mason and Dixon's 
45. P. 42; cf, e.g. , John E. Coons, School Choice as Simple Justice, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 
1992, at 15, 19 ("The machinery of public monopoly was chosen specifically by brahmins . . .  
to coax the children of immigrants from the religious superstitions of their barbarian 
parents."). 
46. For a recent discussion of similar debates in Protestant communities and traditions, 
see MARK A. NOLL, AMERICA'S Goo (2002). 
47. P. 49. The Catholic view on slavery and abolition "certainly included racism, but did 
not wholly depend upon it." Pp. 54-55. Many Catholics "lumped immediate slave 
emancipation with a religious and political radicalism that threatened the foundations of 
society." P. 56. Thus, McGreevy contends, Catholic objections to abolitionism, such as there 
were, "cannot be reduced to the particular American racial dynamic . . . .  This acceptance [of 
slavery] rested upon the pervasive fear of liberal individualism and social disorder that so 
shaped Catholic thought during the nineteenth century, along with the anti-Catholicism of 
many abolitionists." P. 52. 
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but between patriotism and intelligence on one side, and superstition, 
ambition and ignorance on the other.48 
Everyone knew what the President was talking about, and Grant's 
fears tracked broader adjustments in American anti-Catholic 
polemics. Increasingly, the nature, ambitions, and errors of 
Catholicism were seen as political, as well as theological; they 
threatened not only the conscience liberated by Luther, but also the 
Nation unified by Lincoln (p. 96). The vice of Catholicism was not 
simply religious heresy, but dissonance with "national organic unity".49 
These concerns about unity and Catholics' objections to "the 
pretensions of the modern nation-state" "collided with extraordinary 
force in the discussion of public education."50 In part because of recent 
cases like Mitchell v. Helms, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, and Locke v. 
Davey,51 the "school wars" of the late nineteenth century are better 
and more widely understood than they once were. McGreevy 
advances the debate by placing controversies about the Blaine 
Amendments, parochial-school funding, etc., against the backdrop of 
the broader liberal-Catholic conflict, showing that " [t]he desire for a 
state monopoly on education escalated in tandem with nineteenth 
century nationalism throughout Europe, with schools increasingly 
understood as the crucible of citizen formation" (p. 1 12). 
From tension and conflict, McGreevy turns to convergence and 
agreement, on policy if not on fundamental premises. With the "surge 
in labor unrest," the "intensely communal and international vision 
fostered by nineteenth-century ultramontane Catholics became more 
appealing to a new generation of non-Catholic intellectuals and 
reformers struggling to understand a society racked by poverty and 
labor unrest" (p. 126). True, in many quarters, anti-Catholicism as a 
social or cultural phenomenon remained as strong as ever (pp. 124-
25). Nonetheless, the Church-as-implacable-foe-of-modernity served 
even for many of its liberal critics as a useful bulwark against socialism 
48. P. 91. Similarly, after Democratic gains in the 1876 election were chalked up to "the 
combined power of rebellion, catholicism, [stet.] and whiskey," James Garfield worried 
about a "hard, uncomfortable struggle . . .  to save the fruits of the great war." P. 93 (quoting 
THEODORE CLARKE SMITH, 1 THE LIFE AND LEITERS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 613 
(1925)). For more on the 1876 election, see generally ROY MORRIS, JR., FRAUD OF THE 
CENTURY (2003) ;  WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS (2004); and MARK 
WAHLGREN SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, AND REBELLION (2000). 
49. P. 101 (quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, FRAGMENTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ON 
NATIONALISM AND INTER-NATIONALISM 12 (1868)). 
50. Pp. 105, 1 12;  see also, e.g. , Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 460 (2000) (quoting testimony before Congress in 1889, by an 
opponent of parochial schools, to the effect that the "task of absorbing and Americanizing 
these foreign masses . . .  can only be successfully overcome by a uniform system of American 
schools, teaching the same political creed"). 
51. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 
(2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
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(p. 123). On the Catholic side, the publication in 1891 of Pope Leo 
XIII's encyclical, Rerum novarum - today regarded as the 
fountainhead of Catholic social teaching52 _,.. confirmed Catholics' 
more communal vision of society without embracing radical attacks on 
private property. To be sure, the encyclical was more than a baptism 
of progressive assumptions about the state, economy, and society. It 
framed the reformers' questions, and the moral significance of their 
ends, in a specifically Catholic vocabulary, emphasizing the primacy of 
the family, the importance of mediating associations, and so on. In any 
event, it appeared, in the early decades of the twentieth century, that 
Catholics and Americans - progressive, liberal, right-thinking 
Americans - could agree on any number of ends. The "high 
point" for this new "Catholic-Liberal alliance" came with the 
publication and reception in 1931 of Pope Pius Xi's Quadregesimo 
anno, which emphasized the "social character" of ownership and was 
hailed by President Roosevelt as "one of the greatest documents of 
modern times. "53 
Still, even as Catholics and liberals agreed "that the classical liberal 
economic vision of a minimal state and an open economic playing field 
had proved unworkable," it was clear that they "worked from starkly 
different philosophical premises" (p. 138). While Catholic thinking 
had been energized by Pope Leo XIII's call for a renewed emphasis 
on the moral and epistemological realism of St. Thomas Aquinas, 
liberals had turned instead to skepticism, pragmatism, and 
empiricism.54 Moreover, a "cluster of issues" - social and moral 
issues, newly ascendant - "signaled conflict" (p. 153), given that 
Catholics' reservations about atomistic individualism pushed them 
toward the economic reforms championed by Roosevelt, but also 
toward an increasingly solitary conservatism on such matters as 
divorce, censorship, and contraception. Reactions to the presidential 
campaign of Al Smith and Klan-sponsored attacks on Catholic schools 
52. For more on the post-Rerum novarum tradition of Catholic Social Thought, see, e.g. , 
GEORGE WEIGEL & ROBERT ROYAL, BUILDING THE FREE SOCIETY (1993); CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL TEACHING (Edward P. Deberri et al. eds., 2003); ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT (John A. Coleman ed., 1993). In the Fall of 2003, the 
Villanova University School of Law inaugurated a new law journal, The Journal of Catholic 
Social Thought. And a number of legal scholars explore the implications of the Catholic 
Social Thought tradition for legal problems at the "Mirror of Justice" web log, at http://www. 
mirrorofjustice.com (last visited August 18, 2004). 
53. Pp. 150, 151, 153 (citing and quoting Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, in THE PAPAL 
ENCYCLICALS, 1903-1939, at 422, 429, 430 (Claudia Carlen ed., 1981); Geza B. Grosschmid, 
Pech 's Concept of the Living Wage in Quadragesimo Anno, 12 REV. Soc. ECON. 146; 1 THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 778 (Samuel I. Rosenman 
ed., 1938)). 
54. See generally, e.g., LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001) .  
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confirmed the hardiness of fears about Catholics' Americanness.55 As 
liberals' fears turned in the 1930s from socialism to fascism, Catholic 
sympathy for Italy and Spain caused many Americans to ask again, "Is 
there a Catholic problem?"56 
The answer, for many prominent mid-century liberal intellectuals, 
was "yes."57 Accordingly, McGreevy explores the foundations and 
implications of Paul Blanshard's claim - advanced sensationally in his 
bestseller, American Freedom and Catholic Power - that "the 
Catholic problem is still with us," and required "resistance" to 
"counter the antidemocratic social policies of the hierarchy."58 While 
not "a cautious monograph," Blanshard's book "correctly assessed the 
intellectual mood" (p. 166). It was not simply cranks or Protestant 
doctrinal disputants who embraced Blanshard's diagnosis and 
prescription - Mumford, Neibuhr, Einstein, Russell, Dewey, and 
others all agreed. In sum, " [d]iscussion of Catholicism, along with 
criticism of racial segregation and opposition to fascism and 
communism, helped define the terms of post-war American 
liberalism" (p. 168). 
As McGreevy shows, the debate was as much about "America" as 
it was about Catholicism.59 True, tens of thousands of Catholic soldiers 
had proved their "loyalty" to America during the Second World War, 
but to observe that "Catholics would remain loyal citizens was to miss 
the point. Democracy was a culture, not a set of propositions. 
Catholics obviously lived among Americans, but were they of them?" 
(p. 169). In The New Republic's words: 
[T]he real conflict is not between a Church and State or between 
Catholicism and Americanism, but between a culture which is based on 
absolutism and encourages obedience, uniformity and intellectual 
subservience, and a culture which encourages curiosity, hypothesis, ex­
perimentation, verification by facts and a consciousness of the processes 
of individual and social life as opposed to conclusions about it.6() 
55. See, e.g. , Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see generally, e.g. , Stephen L. 
Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1 194 (1997). 
56. P. 165 (citing Is There a Catholic Problem?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 16, 1938, at 
32-33). 
57. See generally, McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own, supra note 17. 
58. P. 166 (quoting BLANSHARD, supra note 17, at 9, 303). 
59. P. 175 ("Defining 'Americanism' . . .  was . . .  the issue."). 
60. P. 170 (quoting More About Catholicism and the Presidency, NEW REPUBLIC, May 
11, 1927, at 315-17). 
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Thus, Catholicism was again pressed into service in a "strategic, 
antithetical role" for intellectuals eager to "demonstrate the non­
hierarchical sources of American culture. "61 
McGreevy situates the Supreme Court's landmark Everson and 
McCollum decisions, and the parochial-schools debate more generally, 
in the context of these concems.62 Although leading liberals had hailed 
the Court's defense of non-state education in Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters as an "immediate service on behalf of the essential spirit of 
liberalism,"63 by mid-century many had come to regard that case as a 
"dangerous inroad" on "the nation's stake in having a common 
democratic education for all its children."64 Catholic schools, it was 
charged, "shielded young Catholics from the democratic way of life,"65 
while the public schools were celebrated by Justice Frankfurter in the 
McCollum case as "the symbol of our democracy and the most 
pervasive means for promoting our common destiny."66 At an even 
deeper level, the parochial-schools and church-state-separation 
debates were not only about American democracy, but also about the 
nature of religion itself. Religion in a democracy, it was often argued, 
is and must be a private matter, a product of individual choice, and the 
end of an "individual quest."67 That Catholicism appeared unable, or 
unwilling, to offer an account of religion and religious liberty that was 
consonant with democracy and individualism made it all the more 
suspect. 
61. P. 175. Increasingly, it was not only the politics and structure of the Catholic Church, 
but also its moral teachings on such matters as divorce and re-marriage, that were criticized 
as anti-democratic. "Democracy is a penetrating principle," one writer insisted, "extending 
into the most intimate relations of life . . . .  Obviously, the Catholic procedure in mixed 
marriages inhibits this spiritual freedom." P. 181 (quoting CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON, 
CAN PROTESTANTISM WIN AMERICA? 73-74 (1948)). 
62. P. 184 (noting that much of the "voluminous" commentary "neglects to place 
Everson and McCollum within the context of an ongoing discussion about Catholicism and 
democracy"). My colleague Bob Rodes recalls Mark de Wolfe Howe's in-class statement 
that "what you think of these cases depends on what you think of the Catholic Church." 
Letter from Robert Rodes, Professor, to Richard Garnett, Professor (on file with author). 
63. P. 182 (quoting Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, June 17, 1925, at 85-86). 
64. P. 182 (quoting MAX LERNER, NINE SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE 195 (Richard 
Cummings ed., 1994)). 
65. P. 186 (quoting, inter alia, one then-prominent scholar's observation that "[y]ou 
cannot practice democratic Jiving . . .  in segregated [Catholic) schools") (quoting Joseph L. 
Blau, Democracy and Parochial Schools, JEWISH FRONTIER, Apr. 1954, at 10, 13). 
66. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.); cf, e.g., 
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23-34 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Our public 
school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent with it than with the 
Catholic culture and scheme of values."). 
67. P. 187 (quoting Agnes E. Meyer, The School, the State, and the Church, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Nov. 1948, at 45, 50). 
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John Courtney Murray, Jacques Maritain, and other like-minded 
thinkers worked to deflect and respond to these suspicions. The task 
taken on by these mid-century Catholic intellectuals was to "bind 
Catholic social thought to democracy, human rights, and religious 
freedom" in a manner consistent with notions of authentic doctrinal 
development,68 and to "allay doubts as to whether 'the Catholic 
Church can adapt herself vitally, on principle, and not merely on 
grounds of expediency, to what is valid in American democratic 
development. '  "69 These efforts appeared to bear fruit, with Pope Pius 
XII observing, during the Second World War, that "the democratic 
form of government" now appeared "as a postulate of nature imposed 
by reason itself";70 with the Church's promiscuous post-war embrace 
of the language of human rights;71 and with the endorsement at the 
Second Vatican Council of Murray's human-dignity-based defense of 
religious freedom.72 Even Paul Blanshard had to concede that 
Catholicism "could no longer be described as a monolithic glacier of 
reactionary thought. "73 
And so, "fears among American intellectuals about Catholic 
power diminished" (p. 208). As during the tum-of-the-century reform 
movements, liberalism and Catholicism seemed to act in common 
cause. Catholic leaders were in the "vanguard" of the fight for racial 
equality and civil rights (p. 211), Catholics enthusiastically embraced 
liberal anti-communism, and the public faces of American Catholicism 
for Americans were Fulton Sheen and John F. Kennedy,74 not 
Bernandine Wiget or Charles Coughlin. At the same time, what 
Reinhold Niebuhr called the Catholics' "ridiculous prohibition of 
68. P. 194; see also pp. 195-96 (discussing, inter alia, John Henry Newman's writings on 
the "development of doctrine"). See generally, e.g. , John T. Noonan, Jr., On the Development 
of Doctrine, AMERICA, Apr. 3, 1999, at 6; JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY 
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (6th ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 
1989} (1845). 
69. P. 192 (quoting Joseph A. Komonchak, " The Crisis in Church-State Relationships in 
the U.S.A . ": A Recently Discovered Text by John Courtney Murray, 61 REV. OF POL. 675, 692 
(1999)). 
70. P. 202 (quoting Pope's Christmas Message, 1944, CATHOLIC MIND 68 (Feb. 1945)). 
71. Pp. 200-03. See generally, e.g. , MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: 
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001}. 
72. See, e.g. , Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration on Religious 
Freedom] � 2 ( 1965) ("It is in accordance with their dignity as persons . . .  that all men 
should be at once impelled by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, 
especially religious truth."). 
73. P. 214 (quoting PAUL BLANSHARD, PAUL BLANSHARD ON VATICAN II, at x (1966)). 
74. The "genuine irrelevance" of religion to Kennedy's administration made him all the 
more palatable to American elites, though his "rigid distinction between religion and public 
life" worried many Catholic leaders. P. 213. Senator John Kerry's 2004 presidential bid 
prompted discussions about the suitability of professing Catholics for political office and the 
authenticity of Kerry's Catholicism. 
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contraception," and the developing clash in the abortion-rights context 
between liberals' increasingly "radical defense of individual 
autonomy" and Catholics' "determin[ation] to protect human life," 
pointed toward continued conflict.75 
McGreevy covers in some detail both the debates within the 
Catholic Church about contraception and abortion and, more 
generally, the political, legal, and social developments involving these 
issues. Two themes receive special emphasis. First, the Catholic 
position on these and other controversial matters came to be regarded 
not only as incorrect and out-of-date, but also as out of place in public 
discourse.76 Many Catholics at mid-century were convinced that 
Catholic moral realism and the Church's unbending insistence on the 
"absolute inviolability of the right of an innocent human person to 
life"77 had been validated and vindicated by the Second World War, 
Nazi atrocities, and abuses at home of euthanasia and sterilization.78 
Nevertheless, as the Catholic Church seemed increasingly to be 
standing alone on questions of sexual and reproductive morality,79 it 
became possible for those advocating liberalization to complain that 
the "religious beliefs of some should not be forced upon all. "80 
Supreme Court Justices warned of "sectarian religious propagandists" 
75. P. 214-15 (quoting Letter from Reinhold Niebuhr to Will Scarlett (Jan. 9, 1960)). 
76. When my colleague, Tom Shaffer, wrote to the American Civil Liberties Union to 
complain that the organization had abandoned the "first principle of secular ethics . . .  that 
life is an absolute value," the ACLU's director stated in response that he regarded 
restrictions on abortion as "an effort to enact theological positions into law." Pp. 260-61 
(quoting Letter from Thomas L. Shaffer to John de Pemberton, March 1, 1967; Letter from 
John de Pemberton to Thomas L. Shaffer (March 27, 1967)). 
77. P. 221 (quoting Fr. John Ford). 
78. Pp. 227-28 ("Catholics also reminded American liberals of Nazi enthusiasm for 
involuntary sterilization and forced euthanasia, helping to discredit once popular liberal 
causes."). 
79. By mid-century, Protestant theologians had "almost uniformly rejected natural law 
arguments [against] contraception." P. 234. And, on the abortion front, by the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, "only Catholics seemed willing to defend restrictions on abortion." P. 261. It 
should be noted, however, that evangelical Protestants had, for the most part, long since 
retreated from the political arena. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Conservatives and the Death 
Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 31 ,  48 (2000) (noting that "evangelicals withdrew from 
social and political activism during some periods"). See generally, e.g., GEORGE M. 
MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FuNDAMENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM (1991); Robert 
Wuthnow, The Future of the Religious Right, in No LONGER EXILES 27 (Michael Cromartie 
ed., 1993). 
80. P. 229. On this point, noted Protestant bioethicist Paul Ramsey "opposed legal 
abortion and warned American liberals not to succumb to an 'anti-Catholicism still there 
beneath the surface in our generally Protestant culture.' " P. 262. It is telling, perhaps, that 
the Southern Baptist Convention hailed Roe v. Wade as "advancing the cause of 'religious 
liberty,' " a  tribute that "seemed directed at Catholics arrogant enough to presume that their 
own views should be law.'' P. 262. 
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and the "hazards of religion's intruding into the political arena."81 
John Rawls's "suspicion of religious arguments became legal 
orthodoxy" {p. 263), and Professor Tribe asserted that Catholic 
opposition to abortion represented "efforts to legislate 'religious faith 
upon which people will invariably differ widely.' "82 
Second, this discussion places in stark relief the central tension 
around which the book is organized, namely, the divide between 
Catholic and liberal understandings of human freedom: "The Catholic 
understanding of the human person clashed with this new liberal 
emphasis on autonomy, as well as with the idea that theological 
arguments were unacceptable in public debate."83 For many liberals, 
influenced perhaps by an increasingly popular European existential­
ism, " [t]he substantive outcome of any particular decision . . .  mattered 
less than protecting the autonomy of the decision-making agent" (p. 
253), while prominent Catholic moralists worried about "the modern 
tendency to make the 'individual himself [the] sole norm of action 
when the chips are down.' "84 In the abortion debate, but also more 
generally, "[e]ven as non-Catholic liberals placed more emphasis on 
individual autonomy, Catholics were drawn to a different vocabulary. 
Solidarity . . .  became important not just with the poor but with the 
unborn" (p. 272). Charles Taylor's powerful and prescient warning 
captures well the Catholic concern: "A romantic view of individual 
autonomy, often commingled in the United . States with anti­
Catholicism, may weaken the solidarity needed to ensure dignity for 
society's most vulnerable members."85 
III. 
McGreevy's concluding chapter includes a survey of the present­
day fallout, both in the Catholic Church and in American politics 
more generally, of the rifts that opened during the 1960s and 1970s: 
the substantial realignment of Catholic voters as abortion rights 
became a fundamental tenet of Democratic Party orthodoxy {pp. 278-
81. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971). 
82. P. 264 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due 
Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1973)). 
83. P. 265. Indeed, McGreevy concludes that the "abortion debate shattered [the] 
Catholic-liberal rapprochement. Whereas in the 1940s liberals had accused Catholics of 
producing citizens incapable of loyalty to American institutions, they now accused Catholics 
of refusing to recognize the moral importance of autonomy." Id. Likewise, a century earlier, 
abolitionists and "liberal reformers [had) stressed the cultural consequences of Catholicism's 
seeming disregard for individual autonomy." P. 13. 
84. P. 255 (quoting JOHN C. FORD & GERALD KELLY, 1 CONTEMP. MORAL THEOLOGY 
138 (1958)). 
85. P .  295 (citing, inter alia, CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1989)). 
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81, 284, 294); the increasingly salient divisions among American 
Catholics on the political, economic, and social implications of 
Catholic social teaching (pp. 287-89); and the bracing condemnation 
by many Catholic bishops of what John Paul II insisted was a "culture 
of death" (pp. 288-89). McGreevy also treats quickly - too quickly, 
perhaps - the recent revelations concerning sexual abuse and 
misconduct by Catholic priests and the shamefully poor response to it 
by many Catholic bishops (pp. 289-93). 
Now, it is a truism - but true nonetheless - that what's past is 
prologue. And so, these final, "current events" pages are valuable not 
so much because they tell us anything new about the state of play in 
abortion politics, the clergy-sex-abuse scandals, or intra-Catholic 
squabbles, but rather because they confirm and illustrate several 
recurring themes in Americans' conversations about Catholicism, 
democracy, and freedom. They remind us that, although Catholicism 
and American Freedom is billed as "a history," its subject is a 
relationship between "two traditions [still] in motion" (p. 15) .  By 
highlighting the salient flashpoints of that relationship over the past 
century-and-a-half, McGreevy helps scholars and engaged citizens to 
understand its current state and difficulties. 
For example: the recent revelations about sexual abuse by Catholic 
clergy, and the shocking failure of Catholic leaders and bishops to 
respond candidly and charitably to it, have prompted appropriate and 
understandable outrage, and also demands for safeguards and 
reform.86 No reasonable observer, even if educated about and sensitive 
to the past and present reality of anti-Catholicism in American 
culture, could blame the Church's current crisis simply on the hostility 
or prejudices of the press. And yet, it is hard to deny that, although the 
Church's gross failures prompted much sound and measured criticism, 
they also gave new life to, and were frequently evaluated in light of, 
"venerable anti-Catholic tropes" about authority, hierarchy, celibacy, 
and sexuality (p. 290). When a perhaps overwrought Attorney 
General of Massachusetts emphasized that the state " 'must' play a 
central role in dictating internal governance reforms that the church 
'must' adopt,"87 and even presumed to instruct the Church concerning 
the selection, training, and ordination of its priests, those familiar with 
86. See generally, e.g. , THE BOSTON GLOBE, BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH (2002). It should be noted - as Professor Jenkins has shown - that, 
notwithstanding the tone and volume of the relevant press coverage, sexual abuse by clergy 
is not as widespread as the headlines suggest and also that such abuse is not uniquely, or 
even particularly, a Roman Catholic problem. See PHILIP JENKINS. PEDOPHILES AND 
PRIESTS (paperback ed., 2001); see also, e.g. , Michael Paulsen & Kevin Cullen, Other 
Denominations Report Abuse Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 2002, at Al.  
87. Harvey Silverglate, Pastors and Prosecutors, WALL ST. J . ,  July 29, 2003, at A14 
(citing MASS. ATT'Y GEN. REP., The Sexual Abuse of Children in the Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese of Boston (2003), at http://www.ago.state.rna.us/filelibrary/archdiocese.pdf). 
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McGreevy's story must have been reminded of that State's earlier 
experiments with nunnery inspections (p. 62), if not the investiture 
crises of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.88 McGreevy's work gently 
but firmly confronts these "tropes," and underscores the long-standing 
liberal temptations to exploit myths about Catholic clergy and to 
counter through intrusive regulation and supervision the Church's 
perceived political and cultural influence. This book should therefore 
be of great value to lawyers, legislators, and scholars working to 
respond to priests' crimes and bishops' failures in a manner consistent 
with religious freedom.89 
Similarly, McGreevy's discussion of the early twentieth-century 
liberal-Catholic alliance on the "social question" and economic reform 
is helpful in assessing present-day discussions about capital 
punishment. The evolution during the last few years of America's 
death-penalty debate90 - for example, the Supreme Court's decision 
in Atkins v. Virginia91, or Governor Ryan's wholescale grant of 
clemency to those on death row in lllinois92 - has included the 
Catholic Church's highly visible re-examination of capital punishment. 
McGreevy discusses, for example, the efforts of Cardinal Joseph 
Bernardin and others to articulate a comprehensive "pro-life" ethic, 
one in which issues such as abortion, euthanasia, violence, and the 
death penalty are linked in a seamless garment (pp. 285-87). And, 
prominent Catholics from Sr. Helen Prejean to Pope John Paul II 
have become some of the world's leading voices against the death 
penalty,93 a fact that is probably curious to those who are conditioned 
to regard the Catholic Church as "conservative." 
Recall, though, McGreevy's observation that agreement and 
concert on the rights of labor, and shared criticisms of laissez faire 
capitalism, obscured the fact that Catholic and liberal reformers often 
worked from radically different premises (pp. 138, 153-54): that is, the 
work and writings of Fr. Ryan and Pope Leo XIII proceeded not from 
statist collectivism, ideological hostility to private property, or an 
88. See generally, e.g. , HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 85-119 (1983). 
89. See generally, e.g. , Symposium, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation 
on Religious Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 947 (2003). 
90. For one interesting, personal account of this evolution, see, for example, SCOTT 
TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT (2003). 
91.  536 U.S. 304 (2002) (concluding that the Constitution does not permit the imposition 
of capital punishment upon "mentally retarded" criminals). 
92. On January 23, 2004, the Supreme Court of Illinois agreed that Governor George 
Ryan acted within his power when, in January 2003, he commuted the death sentences of 
167 inmates and pardoned four others. See People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 804 N.E.2d 546 
(Ill. 2004). 
93. See, e.g. , HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING (1993); POPE JOHN PAUL II, 
EVANGELIUM VITAE [THE GOSPEL OF LIFE] § 56 (1995). See generally E. CHRISTIAN 
BRUGGER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC MORAL TRADITION (2003). 
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uncritical embrace of individual autonomy; but rather from distinctly 
Catholic claims about work, the family, and the structure of civil 
society. Similarly, it is worth remembering today that the Catholic 
Church's opposition to capital punishment is built not on moral 
relativism or skepticism about the reality of evil and of human agency, 
but on fundamental claims about the implications for punishment of 
our status as creatures made in the image and likeness of God.94 
And, of course, it is hardly possible to avoid the continuity, across 
more than 150 years, in our arguments about education, religion, 
citizenship, and democracy. If the animating aspiration of the 
Common School movement and its progeny was the "produc[tion] [of] 
citizens worthy of a democratic republic" (p. 38), leading political 
theorists today likewise insist that education must be structured and 
regulated in a way that renders "liberal citizens . . .  capable of their 
great office."95 No participant in the contemporary school-choice 
arena can help but hear the echoes of earlier liberals' worries about 
the destabilizing and anti-democratic effects of Catholicism and 
Catholic education. If common-school partisans once saw their 
mission as one of liberating children and the Republic's future from 
the prejudices and superstitions of Catholicism, some call today for 
increased regulation of private and religious education in the name of 
children's autonomy96 and the liberal state's commitment to 
"conscious social reproduction."97 Again, the dynamics and debates 
that McGreevy identifies and explores seem helpful, even essential, to 
a well-developed understanding of school vouchers and education 
reform, of First Amendment problems involving the "Blaine 
Amendments" and "pervasively sectarian" schools,98 and of "civic 
education" and political liberalism more generally.99 
94. Cf , e.g. , Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, at 17-21 
(suggesting that contemporary abolitionism in the West has very little to do with the 
influence of Christianity). See generally Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral 
Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 559 
(2003) (contending that the "challenge" for Christian believers in the capital-punishment 
context is to "propose a truthful vision of the human person as 'the noblest work of God -
infinitely valuable, relentlessly unique, endlessly interesting,' and to propose that the 
question of the death penalty stand or fall on that"). 
95. MACEDO, supra note 29, at 275; see also id. at ix (noting that public schools are 
"instruments for the most basic and controversial of civic ends[,] . . .  [t)he project of creating 
citizens"). 
96. See, e.g. , JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998); 
cf , e.g. , Stephen G. Gilles, Hey, Christians, Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 
149 (1999); Michael A. Scaperlanda, Producing Trousered Apes in Dwyer's Totalitarian 
State, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 175 (2002). 
97. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 39, 42 (1987). 
98. See generally, e.g. , Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 2 
FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 45 (2003). 
99. There is a rich scholarly literature on "civic education," and on the challenges posed 
by religious faith, teachings, and communities to certain conceptions of political liberalism. 
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In addition to these and many other instructive links between 
McGreevy's narrative and contemporary questions of policy, several 
of the book's themes resonate with provocative developments and 
arguments in constitutional law and political theory. For example, as 
many scholars have observed (or complained), at the heart of Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist's legacy is a version of "federalism" that 
emphasizes the connections between the protection and vitality of 
individual freedoms and the Constitution's structural features. These 
structural features both preserve and clear out the "space" of civil 
society in which associations and mediating institutions do their work 
of creating norms, forming citizens, and protecting freedom. As 
Professor McGinnis has explored in great detail, a powerful and 
pervasive theme in the Rehnquist Court's decisions is a recognition, 
and even a celebration, of the place in civic life of mediating 
associations, their expression, and their diversity.100 
It is worth reflecting, then, on the fact that many of the differences 
that McGreevy identifies and describes between Catholic and liberal 
understandings of "freedom" stem from different understandings of 
the relation between individual freedom and autonomy, on the one 
hand, and the freedom and autonomy of groups and mediating 
institutions, on the other. The claim that, perhaps more than any 
other, animates McGreevy's account is that the Catholic view was and 
remains less individualistic, and more communal or communitarian, 
than the liberal one.101 It should be emphasized, though, that Catholic 
social teaching is not reducible to the amorphous "communitarianism" 
that is fashionable in many circles, to statist collectivism, or even to 
centralization generally.102 What is distinct about Catholic social 
See, e.g., MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION (1999); MACEDO, 
supra note 29; MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Diane Ravitch 
& J. Viteritti eds., 2001); NOMOS XLIII: MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION (Stephen 
Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002); William Galston, Civic Education in the Liberal State, in 
LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 89 (Nancy Rosenblum ed., 1989); Stephen G. Gilles, On 
Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996); Michael W. 
McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does Our 
Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 CHI. LEGAL F. 123 (1991). 
100. See McGinnis, supra note 31, at 526-43; see also Garnett, supra note 31, at 1853-54; 
Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 27, 
27 (2001) (arguing that "[f]ederalism promotes social capital because dividing power 
between the national government and the states provides greater opportunities for citizen 
groups to influence politics and for individual citizens to participate in public life"). But see, 
e.g. , Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the 
First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1506 (2001) ("Many of America's Founding 
Fathers . . .  didn't think much of voluntary associations."). 
101. See, e.g. , Lacey, supra note 6 (stating that McGreevy "pits a long-sustained but 
eroding Catholic communitarian vision of the uses of freedom against a more pervasive, 
individualistic view that issued from Protestant doctrines of liberty of conscience and the 
rights of private judgment"). 
102 Cf Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought and the Corporation 2 (Oct. 
22, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
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thought is not simply that it emphasizes "community" rather than 
individual "autonomy," but why it emphasizes community. 
Accordingly, the principle of "subsidiarity" serves as a bulwark 
against both excessive individualism and stultifying centralization. 
"Subsidiarity," in a nutshell, is the "principle of limited government" 
according to which " [t]he state should do only what cannot effectively 
be done by private action, and whenever possible the individual 
should make his own decisions."103 Like American federalism, the 
principle recognizes the connection between associational freedoms 
and the authentic freedom and flourishing of persons.104 However, its 
end is not devolution for its own sake, any more than the Catholic 
critique of individualism that McGreevy traces supports centralization 
for its own sake.105 The Catholic notion of subsidiarity, like Catholics' 
assertedly more "communal" orientation, aims ultimately not at the 
good of the state, or at the greatest good for the greatest number, but 
at the "common good" of persons, i.e., at achieving "those conditions 
of social life by which individuals, families, and groups can achieve 
their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and ready way."106 Thus, 
the different ideas of "freedom" running through McGreevy's account 
are not reducible to the claim that "liberals talk about the individual, 
while Catholics talk about community." Yes, as McGreevy describes, 
"Catholics talk about community," but this is because of its asserted 
connection to human "freedom." After all, the authentic freedom of 
461100). (criticizing the "persistent error" in the "collectivist moral strain" of many writing 
in the tradition of Catholic social teaching). Indeed, as McGreevy observes, the "reluctance 
of nineteenth-century Catholics to view the nation-state as the end of human history now 
seems prescient." P. 294. 
103. David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 2D SER. GREEN BAG 359, 359 n.1 (1997); see also 
Pope John Paul II, Centissimus annus [Encyclical Letter on the Hundredth Anniversary of 
Rerum novarum) 'l[ 48 (1991) (noting that subsidiarity is the principle according to which "a 
community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a 
lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need 
and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view 
to the common good,"); Mary Ann Glendon, Civil Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1996, at 
39, 40 ("Subsidiarity [is) the principle of leaving social tasks to the smallest social unit that 
can perform them adequately.") (reviewing MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S 
DISCONTENT (1996)). 
104. This is not to say that subsidiarity is entirely co-extensive with American 
federalism, or vice versa. See generally Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of 
Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001) [hereinafter Vischer, 
Subsidiarity as a Principle of Goverance] . 
105. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance, supra note 104, at 116 
("Subsidiarity is not a knee-jerk shunning of government authority . . . .  Rather, subsidiarity 
is a principled tendency toward solving problems at the local level and empowering 
individuals, families and voluntary associations to act more efficaciously in their own lives."). 
106. Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et spes, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 283-84 
(Joseph Gallagher trans., Walter M. Abbott ed. 1966). See Richard W. Garnett, Common 
Schools and the Common Good: Reflections on the School-Choice Debate, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REV. 219 (2001). 
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persons is no less fundamental to Catholic thinking than it has been to 
the liberal tradition.107 McGreevy performs a valuable service in 
pushing us to realize that the Catholic tradition in America has not so 
much opposed freedom as proposed a different kind of freedom, or -
as Professor Rodes puts it, "a deeper understanding of freedom."108 
Also running through both of these traditions is an argument about 
Catholics' loyalty. The "Catholic problem," in the imagination of 
American liberals, has often been conceived in terms of loyalty to 
democracy, to nation, and - more recently - to autonomy-based 
morality.109 The charge, in Murray's words, has been that "You are 
among us but you are not of us."110 It is no longer (as it once was) that 
Catholics' political allegiances might lie in Rome, or with Italy or 
Spain, but rather that they ostentatiously, and increasingly 
anomalously, dissent from what are widely regarded as foundational 
normative premises. On this point, Professor Carter's 1995 Massey 
Lectures provide a provocative meditation on the competing demands 
of "loyalty" made by the state and by mediating associations, including 
religious communities, and also on the state's efforts to instill such 
loyalty via education and other means.111 It is important to recognize, 
Carter reminds us, that religious traditions seek to "project into the 
future an understanding of the world that may be quite different from 
that of the sovereign majority of . . .  citizens."112 It is because they 
"demand forms of allegiance and thus of loyalty"113 that their claims 
pose an obstacle to what Carter calls the "project of liberal 
107. See, e.g. , Bainbridge, supra note 102, at 1 ("If a concern for human freedom 
·
is not 
at the center of Catholic social teaching, it is at least very near."). 
108. ROBERT E. RODES, JR., PILGRIM LAW 13 (1998) (noting that "(i]n a good deal of 
medieval thought, freedom is seen as the power of a created being to move without 
hindrance in the way God intended"). 
109. As McGreevy puts it, discussing European anti-clericalism, "(p]articular targets . . .  
were the men's religious orders, precisely because members of the orders emphasized loyalty 
to the pope above national allegiance." P. 21. He notes also that many American liberals 
cheered Bismarck's Kulturkampf, and nodded when Gladstone insisted that "British 
Catholics could [not] simultaneously be loyal to the papacy and to the nation." P. 98. 
1 10. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 20 ("The neo-Nativist . . .  addresses to the Catholic 
[this] charge: 'You are among us but you are not of us.' . . .  To this charge the Catholic . . .  
will politely reply that this is Jacobinism, noveau style, and that Jacobinism, any style, is out 
of style in this day and age.''). 
111. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED (1998). 
1 12 Id. at 141; id. at 30 ("(A] principal purpose of religious narrative and religious 
observance is to preserve the tradition of the past and project it into the future."); id. at 27 
("(T]he meanings that they discover and assign to the world may be radically distinct from 
those that are assigned by the political sovereign."). See also, e.g. , Charles Taylor, Religion in 
a Free Society, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE 93, 100 (James Davison Hunter 
& Os Guinness eds., 1990) ("(T]he Christian church gave its members a universal allegiance, 
which could easily conflict with, or at least rival their political ties.''). 
1 13. Carter, supra note 111 ,  at 29-30. 
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constitutionalism,"114 which includes an effort to "create[] a single, 
nationwide community with shared values and shared, enforceable 
understandings of how local communities of all descriptions should be 
organized. "115 
But if McGreevy's analysis of the relationship between American 
liberalism and Catholicism reveals a pattern of concern about the 
compatibility of the latter with the former, i.e., about the problem of 
Catholic dissent from liberal autonomy, there are also those who 
object to American Catholics' excessive accommodations to America 
and American freedom. Although Catholicism and American Freedom 
is a work of history, not advocacy, it seems fair to read McGreevy as 
broadly sympathetic to the Brownson/Murray project of situating 
Catholicism within the American consensus, of framing America's 
ends and ideals as consistent with Catholicism, and of searching for 
and emphasizing a fundamental harmony between Catholicism and 
the United States. Today, as before, arguments persist over the 
feasibility, and integrity, of that project. 
My colleague, Professor Michael Baxter, along with theologian 
Stanley Hauerwas, has argued that the American set of "political 
arrangements" "present[s] a deep and intractable challenge" for "that 
community whose allegiance is first and foremost to the Kingship of 
Christ."116 It is widely supposed, Baxter and Hauerwas observe, that a 
"central purpose" of those arrangements "is the subordination of 
religion to the political order, meaning the primacy of democracy."117 
Thus, "in their embrace of the American experiment, Catholics have 
learned to adapt to a political landscape marked by religious 
indifferentism."118 In Baxter's view, the appropriate, authentic 
response to doubts about Catholics' loyalty is not irenicism, but 
irresolution.119 Certainly, this is a controversial position, and it is not 
obviously a weakness in McGreevy's book that he fails to endorse it. 
The point here is simply that our public conversations about law, 
religion, citizenship, and loyalty would be improved if their 
114. Id. at 29. 
115. Id. at 19. 
116. Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, C.S.C., The Kingship of Christ: Why Freedom 
of"Belief' ls Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 107 (1992). 
117. Id. at 109 (quoting George F. Will, Conduct, Coercion, Belief, WASH. POST, Apr. 
22, 1990, at B7). 
118. Id. at 120. See generally, e.g. , ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN RELIGION (2003). 
119. Id. at 127 (noting that the life of Father Max Josef Metzger - a former German 
Army chaplain who became a peace activist - "demonstrates that 'making peace' with the 
polities of this world is not the first task of a Church that worships Christ the King."). 
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participants acquired a greater sensitivity to the matter of religious 
believers' competing loyalties.12° 
Finally, as was just mentioned, running through this book is a claim 
that Catholic morality and political theory are more communitarian 
than individualistic, solidaristic than atomistic, and so on. This is a 
claim, however, that goes deeper than claims about how societies, 
governments, and economies should be organized. Even more 
important is the fact that Catholicism proposes a moral anthropology 
that is at odds with the one proposed by liberalism, and that this 
deeper difference is at the heart of the dynamic explored in this 
book.121 That is, a fundamental, different claim about what the human 
being is and is for spins off the various disagreements about what 
government can, should, and should not do. 
Now, by "moral anthropology," I mean "an account of what it is 
about the human person that does the work in moral arguments about 
what we ought or ought not to do and about how we ought or ought 
not to be treated."122 In the Psalmist's words, "Lord, what is 
man . . .  that thou makest account of him?"123 This is not only a prayer, 
but a starting point for jurisprudential reflection. After all, as John 
Courtney Murray once observed, " [i]n the end, every structure of 
moral doctrine and decision rests on a concept of the nature of 
man."124 All moral problems are anthropological problems, because 
moral arguments are built, for the most part, on anthropological 
presuppositions.125 
For a recent example of anthropological reflection in the service of 
jurisprudential argument, consider a recent article by Professor Steven 
120. In a similar vein, my colleague and teacher, Tom Shaffer, commented to me that 
these conversations - and perhaps also McGreevy's own account - would be enriched by · 
paying greater attention to the experiences and communities of the later Catholic 
immigrants. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY SHAFFER, AMERICAN LA WYERS 
AND THEIR COMMUNITIES (1991). 
121. See, e.g. , Richard John Neuhaus, An Argument About Human Nature, in A NEW 
WORLDLY ORDER 132 (George Weigel ed., 1992). 
122. Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death 
Penalty, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 541, 543 (2003). 
123. Psalms 143:3 (King James). 
124. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 296; id. at 126 ("The basic question that modernity has 
come to, of course, is what is man?"). 
125. As Professor Elshtain has put it, our attempts at moral judgment tend to reflect our 
foundational assumptions about what it means to be human. Jean Bethke Elshtain, The 
Dignity of the Human Person and the Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries, 14 J.L. & 
RELIGION 53 (1999-2000). My colleague John Coughlin has noted that the "anthropological 
question" is both "perennial" and profound: "What does it mean to be a human being?" 
John J. Coughlin, Law and Theology: Reflections on What it Means to Be Human, 74 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 609, 609 (2000); Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: 
The Neglected Center of the First Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233, 1235 [hereinafter 
Smith, Believing Persons] ("(E]very body of Jaw and legal discourse will necessarily embrace 
some conception, or perhaps multiple conceptions, of the person."). 
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Smith, in which he "addresses how our conception of what it means to 
be a person influences First Amendment law."126 In his view, our law 
generally, and our First Amendment doctrine in particular, have 
"suffered by embracing conceptions of the person ill-advisedly 
imported from other disciplines or philosophical perspectives" and 
would "be strengthened and enriched by a more self-conscious 
recognition of . . .  'the person as believer.' "127 What is more, Smith 
contends, a law of religious freedom - or, more generally, a theory of 
political community - that proceeded from a "believer" -based 
anthropology would contrast markedly, and in important ways, from 
one that rested, say, on Rawlsian political liberalism, which 
encourages, and even requires, the radical privatization of religion.128 
Smith's argument is important and provocative, and this is not the 
place for a detailed account or response. It is enough here to suggest 
that the kinds of examinations and reflections proposed and 
undertaken by Smith are promising, and that McGreevy's history 
should assist them by showing how one particular set of arguments 
and experiences across time has been shaped not simply by different 
notions of "freedom," but also by different views of who and what we 
really are who struggle for it. 
CONCLUSION 
The word "religion" comes from religare, which means to "tie fast" 
or bind together.129 And yet, many today appear to regard religion's 
purported capacity - even tendency - to "divide" as its near­
defining feature.130 True, few epithets in contemporary discourse are 
as biting, yet as tedious and vacuous, as the charge that a person, 
claim, argument, proposal, or belief is "divisive.'' The term - like 
"controversial" and "partisan" - often seems to do little more than 
signal the speaker's disapproval, and her desire that the offending 
target either be quiet, or change her tune. Nevertheless, American 
society is, we are told time and again, fractured, split, partisan; it is, 
about many things and in many ways, "divided." We are, Gertrude 
126. Smith, Believing Persons, supra note 125, at 1233. 
127. Id. at 1235; id. at 1241 ("[T]he believing person is central to First Amendment 
commitments and . . .  First Amendment jurisprudence has suffered by neglecting this central 
concern."). 
128. Id. at 1284-85. 
129. The Middle French derivative is relier, "to connect, fasten together." WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (entry for "religion"). 
130. Cf John C. Danforth, Leaders Can Find Unity in What Divides Us, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 2002, at B3 ("The root meaning of the word suggests that religion 
is supposed to bind us together. If this is so, then those 'religions' that are divisive should be 
called by another name. To call a belief that is designed to be a wedge a religion is deceptive 
to the point of being fraudulent."). 
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Himmelfarb contends, "One Nation, two cultures."131 What is more, it 
is difficult to avoid the impression that social and political fault lines 
trace, even if they do not clearly result from, religious differences and 
disagreements. " [T]here is," several researchers have concluded, "a 
new religious order in American electoral politics, one characterized 
not only by the distinctive partisanship of religious traditions, but also 
by theological polarization within the nation's three largest tradi­
tions."132 These divisions should not be overstated, but they are real.133 
Catholicism and American Freedom opens and closes with 
divisions, both in the American political community and in the Roman 
Catholic Church.134 Certainly, McGreevy does not celebrate these 
divisions. Nevertheless, one of this book's many lessons might be that, 
in the end, we should "cherish only modest expectations with regard 
to the solution of the problem of religious pluralism and civic unity."135 
At the same time, this work offers the attractive, unifying hope that as 
the "long Catholic encounter with American ideas of freedom" 
continues, all will come to appreciate "that associations and ties with 
the strangers in our midst satisfy our deepest, most common 
aspirations" (p. 295). 
131. See also, e.g. , GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTURES (2001); 
David Brooks, One Nation, Slightly Divisible, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 86; see 
also STANLEY B .  GREENBERG, THE Two AMERICAS (2004). 
132. James L. Guth et al., America Fifty/Fifty, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2001, at 19 (noting 
that "[r]eligion played a key role in determining both the partisan polarization and the 
disengagement that characterized the public in 2000"); News Release: The Pew Forum on 
Religion & Pub. Life, Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus 1 (July 24, 2003) 
("Religion is a critical factor these days in the public's thinking about contentious policy 
issues and political matters."). 
133. But see, e.g. , ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL (1998). 
134. The Eliot School Rebellion, remember, involved Catholic dissent from compulsory 
recitation of the King James Bible, a text that reflected, among other things, a rejection of 
the "Puritan error" of "social divisiveness." NICOLSON, supra note 34, at 90; see also id. at 
121 (noting that radical Puritans were excluded from the company of translators because 
"[t ]he heart of their thinking was divisive, not part of the unifying national project"). 
135. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 23. 
